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Media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior. News coverage depends not only
on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups.
We present a theoretical model of the interaction between special interest groups and media outlets in
which the media face a trade-o⁄ between a larger audience and lower payments from special interest
groups versus a smaller audience and more biased content. We focus on the relationship between the
costs of production of media product and the level of distortion in news coverage that can be introduced
by interest groups. Speci￿cally, we look at the e⁄ect of falling marginal costs or the growing reliance
on advertising revenues. We show that if people do not want to tolerate bias, or if special interest
groups have budget constraint, then this e⁄ect is negative. If people do not pay attention to bias, or if
the size of the audience is very important for the interest group, then this e⁄ect becomes positive. If
markets are fully covered, and all consumers buy one unit of media product, then the e⁄ect disappears.
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11 Introduction
Despite the journalistic ideal of "just reporting the truth", media outlets as a rule operate as pro￿t
maximizing ￿rms. News coverage depends on the preferences of those who pay for it. Most of the literature
suggests that economic growth will decrease media dependence on subsidies from various interest groups
by increasing the value of the media audience for media outlets (Gentzkow et al. (2006), Baldasty (1992),
Hamilton (2004), Starr (2004)). However, we do not observe that media around the world are becoming
free and independent everywhere, even though advertising revenues have gone up and the marginal costs
of production have fallen over the past 100 years.
Most existing theoretical models cannot explain why this fails to happen in a market economy.1 In
this paper, we aim to ￿ll the gap by examining the conditions under which economic development indeed
should have a positive e⁄ect on media independence. We develop a theoretical model of the interaction
between media outlets and interest groups in a two-sided market. The model shows how the structure of
media revenues a⁄ects distortions in news coverage. The sign of the e⁄ect of either falling marginal costs
of production or increasing reliance on advertising revenues depends on the model￿ s assumptions. There
will be a positive relationship between the costs of production and the distortions in media coverage if:
people do care about objective coverage; special interest groups are budget constrained; and for a special
interest group, the size of the audience is not very important. There will be a negative relationship if:
media consumers are ready to tolerate biased coverage, and for a special interest group, the extent of
distortion in news coverage and the size of the audience are complements. Finally, if the markets are
fully covered, that is every consumer buys one unit of media product, and there is competition between
media outlets, there is no relationship.
In our model, di⁄erent special interest groups o⁄er menus of subsidies to media outlets, in order to
1One exception is Gehlbach and Sonin (2008) who analyze non-market strategies used by governments, such as explicit
censorship or nationalization of media outlets.
2induce editors or media owners to distort the news in a particular way.2 A media outlet￿ s pro￿t depends
on three sources of revenues: sales revenues; advertising revenues; and payments by special interest
groups. Our model assumes that each interest group wants media outlets to be more extreme than they
would choose to be without external in￿ uence. Therefore, one of the following cases is realized: in the
￿rst case, as the marginal revenues of a media outlet go up, it becomes costlier for an interest group to
subsidize the media outlet, because it does not want to pay all of these costs in full. If marginal costs go
down, then bias should go down, as in Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Besley and Prat (2006).
In the second case, as the marginal revenues of a media outlet go up, the media outlet can lower the
price for media consumers, thus increasing the audience. As a result, an interest group which is interested
in the size of the audience will be willing to pay even more for its preferred news coverage, and the bias
will increase.
Finally, in the case of fully covered markets, and with any increase in marginal revenues perfectly
o⁄set by a corresponding change in price, any marginal change in an outlet￿ s pro￿t is competed away.
Thus, for special interest groups, payments to induce a particular type of news coverage are as costly as
before.
The interest groups in the model are interested in media content and include special interest groups,
advertisers, politicians, or governments. The special interest groups might be interested in in￿ uencing
media because it a⁄ects public opinion and, in turn, the preferences of politicians regarding the policy
chosen, or the salience of certain policy issues (Sobbrio (2010), Alston et al. (2010)).
As to the advertisers, we assume that in addition to explicit advertising contracts in the spot market,
there are also implicit advertising contracts that govern discounted streams of future media revenues
2Theoretically, we use the menu-auction approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Formally, we modify and extend
the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (2001), except that in our presentation media
outlets play the role of policymakers. Our model also is related to Ujhelyi (2009) who considers the budget constraint of a
special interest group and its e⁄ect on the policy choice.
3and are conditional on media￿ s behavior. As General Motors spokesman Brian Arke said (when GM
terminated its advertising contract with the Los Angeles Times after a negative article by Dan Neil):
"We recognize and support the news media￿ s freedom to report and editorialize as they see ￿t. Likewise,
GM and its retailers are free to spend our advertising dollars where we see ￿t."3 The empirical results
of Gambaro and Puglisi (2009) imply that in the Italian press the news coverage of advertisers is more
positive than coverage of other companies, and this results in higher stock market returns for advertisers.
Governments also can exert the in￿ uence over media outlets: by using bribes, as in Peru (McMillan
and Zoido (2004); by persecutions of journalists, as in some former Soviet Union countries (Reporters
without Borders, 2005); or by state ownership and censorship, as in many countries around the world
(Djankov et al. (2003)).4 In such circumstances, governments trade o⁄ the bene￿ts of distortion in news
coverage against the aggregate costs of in￿ uencing media ￿rms, including any non-monetary costs.
Finally, particular politicians or political parties might subsidize media outlets. In the 19th century
United States, for example, the majority of newspapers were a¢ liated with political parties which had
some control over their news coverage. The parties generated rents for a¢ liated media outlets through
the distribution of o¢ cial printing contracts which paid for printing local laws and ordinances. They
also advertised that subscribing to partisan newspapers was a duty of every devoted party member, thus
fostering newspapers￿circulations.5
Our paper is closely related to Ellman and Germano (2009) who analyze the interaction between a
particular type of special interest group, advertisers, and media outlets in a two-sided market. In their
model, if competing media outlets rely more on revenues from advertisers, will lead to less media bias
because of increased competition for the audience. Advertisers can counter this by committing to punish
3Source: BBC News 04/08/2005.
4This does not always means that the censorship is explicit. For example, according to a survey of journalists conducted
in 2004 by Center "Public Expertise", 40% of Russian journalists do not feel "external censorship or pressure", but are
subject to "self-censorship".
5See Kaplan (2002), Petrova (2010) for more details.
4media outlets that publish negative stories. Our model di⁄ers in several respects, though. First, we
consider a more general speci￿cation for the utility of an interest group, and for the consumer demand
for news coverage. Thus we are able to identify three distinct e⁄ects of the growth of advertising. The
Paradox result of Ellman and Germano (2009) could be explained in the context of our model, because
in their paper the bias and the size of the audience are complements for advertisers. Second, because we
have di⁄erent types of interest groups, we can potentially di⁄erentiate between the e⁄ects of advertising
on political distortions in news coverage (special interest groups include politicians or governments) and
the e⁄ects of advertising on commercial distortions in coverage (for example, by omitting negative news
about a particular company, since special interest groups are advertisers). Finally, we derive di⁄erent
implications for the e⁄ect of competition on commercial media bias. In the model of Ellman and Germano
(2009), the competition is bene￿cial as long as punishment strategies are not used. In our model, this
is not always true. In our paper the competition does not lead to the outcome optimal from the social
point of view in the case of fully covered markets and if there is low elasticity of consumer demand with
respect to bias.6
There is a growing body of literature about relationships between media outlets and various interest
groups with their own preferences for media content. Herman and Chomsky (1988) , Baker (1994), and
Hamilton (2004) argue that news media are biased in favor of advertisers. Surely, media bias also can
arise as a result of capture by governments or incumbent politicians (Besley and Prat (2006), Egorov
et al. (ming), Gehlbach and Sonin (2008), Puglisi (2004)), interest groups (Herman and Chomsky (1988),
Grossman and Helpman (2001), Sobbrio (2010), Alston et al. (2010)), journalists (Baron (2006), Puglisi
(2006)), or the set of actors involved in news production (Bovitz et al. (2002)). Other studies focus on
the demand side of the problem,analyzing how consumer demand for a certain type of content a⁄ects the
choices made by the media (Dyck et al. (2008), Gasper (2009), Gentzkow et al. (2006), Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005)). Our paper uses both supply-side and demand-side approaches, and shows how media
6This ￿nding parallels the results of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gabszewicz et al. (2001).
5outlets frame content in response to both subsidies and advertising payments by special interest groups
and the preferences of the media audience.
In the paper, a media outlet simultaneously sells the product to media consumers, advertisers, and
special interest groups. To a special interest group, the pro￿tability of the transaction depends on the
price of a media product for consumers. In contrast, consumer demand depends on the type of media
coverage distorted by the special interest groups. So, in a de￿nition of Rochet and Tirole (2006), the model
involves a two-sided market, with each side introducing an externality for the other.7 In this respect,
our model di⁄ers from Besley and Prat (2006), Gentzkow et al. (2006), or Gehlbach and Sonin (2008),
which focus only on the e⁄ect of the interest group on the pro￿t function of a media outlet, and from
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Dyck et al. (2008), which incorporate only the consumer demand
e⁄ect. Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) discuss di⁄erent models of media outlets as platforms in a two-
sided market between advertisers and media consumers, and they derive the revenue-neutrality result.8
Gabszewicz et al. (2001) analyze how the political bias of newspapers may change as the importance
of advertising increases. However, our paper is di⁄erent from theirs because we consider more general
speci￿cations for the utilities of interest groups and for the consumer demand for news coverage. Thus
we are able to identify three di⁄erent e⁄ects of the relative importance of advertising.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, section 3 analyzes
equilibria in the game, and section 4 discusses the results and o⁄ers conclusions.
7The general discussion of two-sided markets can be found in Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Rochet
and Tirole (2006).
8Other papers analyze the e⁄ects of competition in media markets. Anderson and Coate (2005) provide welfare analysis of
advertising and competition in media industry. Anderson and McLaren (2007) present a model of competition and mergers
with politically motivated media owners.
62 Model
In the model there are media outlets and special interest groups. We start from the basic case of one
media outlet and then extend the model for the case of duopoly.
A media outlet chooses a type of news coverage and a price for its media product. An outlet￿ s coverage
is characterized by the extent and the direction of media bias. A media outlet acts as a pro￿t maximizing
agent; its pro￿t is a sum of the sales revenues, the advertising revenues, and the subsidies from special
interest groups. Each special interest group cares about the outlet￿ s coverage and the size of its audience.
To model the subsidies from the special interest groups, we use the menu auctions theoretical ap-
proach.9 Each group o⁄ers a menu of subsidies which is conditional on a media outlet￿ s news coverage.
These subsidies are similar to the contribution schedules in the framework of Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and Grossman and Helpman (2001). Each media outlet observes the menus of subsidies o⁄ered
by all special interest groups and then chooses news content and the product price which maximizes the
outlet￿ s pro￿t.10
In the model a media outlet changes its news coverage in order to get subsidies from special interest
groups, which leads to a decrease in the size of the outlet￿ s audience. This trade-o⁄ between the size of
audience and the extent of bias is a fundamental problem which the media outlet solves.
2.1 Framework
The media outlet chooses the type of news coverage z. In the simple version of the model presented here,
z is unidimensional.11 This setup assumes that there is some unbiased coverage which corresponds to
9Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
10Note that a media owner can be considered as a special interest group; if the media outlet deviates from a pro￿t
maximizing media policy in order to please its owner, this shift corresponds to forgone pro￿t. In such a framework, the loss
of pro￿t is equivalent to spending money on the subsidies.
11An older version of this paper analyzed the case of multidimensional z. We choose to drop this extension as the
interpretation becomes more di¢ cult and proofs become more complicated.
7the absence of media bias.
The concept of the type of news coverage which we use re￿ ects the discretion which media outlets
have in framing and choosing the content of their news product. They can choose which topics to cover
(Iyengar and Kinder (1987), McCombs (2004)), which expert to quote (Groseclose and Milyo (2005)), or
which candidates to endorse (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006)).12
Assume that the preferences of media consumers are described by the demand function q(p;z) which
depends on both the media coverage z chosen by the media outlet and the price of the media product
p.13 We also assume that this demand function is additively separable with respect to p and z:
q(p;z) = h(z) ￿ g(p) ￿ 0 (1)
Both functions g(p) and h(z) are continuously di⁄erentiable, g(p) is linear with g0(p) > 0, and h(z) is
concave with h0(jzj) < 0.14
Media outlet
A media outlet maximizes the pro￿t which depends on sales revenues, advertising revenues, and the
12Numerically, media bias can be measured as the deviation from the political orientation of the median member of
Congress (Groseclose and Milyo (2005)), mutual fund recommendations in the absence of advertising (Reuter and Zitzewitz
(2006)), or independent wine rating (Reuter (2002)). It may also describe if the state of the world is misreported (as in
models of Besley and Prat (2006), Gentzkow et al. (2006), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Petrova (2008), and Puglisi
(2004)).
13Utility-maximizing consumers can tolerate media bias and have non-zero demand for biased coverage because of be-
havioral assumptions (i.e. people have non-rational preferences for particular kinds of media bias, e.g. Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005)), or because some consumers do not pay a lot of attention to bias (e.g. consume media product mainly for
entertainement, as in Prior (2007)). Consumers can evaluate the extent of media bias as they have prior beliefs about what
is unbiased coverage (stereotypes for Lippmann (1922), or the initial impressions of Rabin and Schrag (1999)).
14Assumption (1) implies that without special interest groups the optimal price does not depend on bias. This speci￿cation
of demand includes standard linear demand in the form D(p) = A ￿ bp where the intercept A does not depend on z, and
g(p) = bp.
8payments by special interest groups. Formally, the media outlet maximizes
max




where p is the unit price of a media product, d is the marginal cost of production, a is advertising revenue
per media consumer, and Ci(z) is the menu of subsidies o⁄ered by special interest group i: Advertising
revenue per reader is taken as given, for the purpose of simpli￿cation, similar to Besley and Prat (2006)
and Gentzkow et al. (2006). It is important to distinguish between the advertisers interested only in the
size of the audience and the special interest groups interested in the size of the audience and in the type
of media coverage z. Ci(z) might take the form of direct subsidies (e.g. from the government or from
the business group which owns the outlet), discounted future payments in the case of implicit advertising
contracts,15 printing contracts (e.g. 19th century U.S., as discussed in Baldasty (1992), Kaplan (2002),
Petrova (2010)), bribes (in countries with imperfect institutions, e.g. in Peru, as described by McMillan
and Zoido (2004)), or even credible threats of physical punishments (as described in annual reports by
the Reporters without Borders).
Subsidy Ci(z) from special interest group i is conditional only on the type of news coverage z, and
the price is chosen optimally by the media outlet from problem (2).16 The pro￿t of the media outlet
15The story about the General Motors and the Los Angeles Times, brie￿ y described in the introduction, is an illustrative
one. It exempli￿es the existence of implicit advertising contracts, in which a media outlet not only sells its advertising space,
but also commits not to cover its advertisers negatively. A threat point here is cancelling the contract, precisely as the
story shows. When in 1979 Mother Jones published a critical article written by G. Blair "Why Dick Can￿ t Stop Smoking?"
which described the addictive e⁄ects of tobacco smoking, tobacco companies (Phillip Morris, Brown and Williamson, and
others) responded by cancelling their long-term advertising contracts with the magazine. In addition, "in a show of corporate
solidarity," many liquor companies follow their example.(Bates, E. "Smoked Out", Mother Jones, March/April 1996 issue.)
Herman and Chomsky (1988) provide a plenty of evidences of these implicit advertising contracts. They highlight the
importance of advertising as one of the ￿￿lters" which information passes before becoming the news, inducing a bias toward
special interest groups. Both Parenti (1986) and Bagdican (1997) o⁄er examples of stories or programs killed because of the
fear of o⁄ending advertisers.
16Theoretical results of the paper also hold if subsidies Ci depend on both z and p. Proofs, however, require additional
9without the contributions from special interest groups is given by ￿(p;z;0) = ￿(p;z) = (p+a￿d)q(p;z).
News coverage and media bias
In the space of potential types of news coverage the point which maximizes the demand for a media
product is normalized to 0.
argmax
z
q(p;z) = 0 (3)
Note that the optimal z which solves this problem does not vary with p, by assumption (1). So, jzj char-
acterizes the extent of media bias, i.e. the amount of distortion in equilibrium news coverage introduced
by the subsidizing interest group.
The maximum pro￿t which can be earned without contributions from special interest groups is denoted
as ￿￿. The price that yields maximum to the pro￿t without subsidies is given by
p￿ = argmax
p;z






Special interest group i receives utility from media coverage z, audience size q, and income. Its payo⁄
is
Ui(z;q;C(￿)) = Wi(z;q) ￿ Ci(z) (4)
where Ci(z) is a payment to the media outlet. Function W is such that W(z;q(p(z);z)) is a concave
function of news coverage z with a unique maximum, where p(z) = argmax
p
(p+a￿d)q(p;z) is the optimal
price. A special interest group i has one most preferred news coverage b zi given by





assumptions on the sum of derivatives of the demand function which are di¢ cult to interpret. Empirically, it seems plausible
that the subsidizing group clearly speci￿es what kind of coverage it would like to have or avoid, but does not intervene into
pricing decisions.
10The timing of the game is as follows: ￿rst, special interest groups simultaneously o⁄ers menus of
subsidies Ci(￿) to the media outlet, second, the media outlet observes these menus of subsidies and
chooses p and z, and, ￿nally, media consumption takes place, and all agents receive their payo⁄s.
3 Analysis
3.1 One media outlet and one special interest group
Consider ￿rst the case of one media outlet and one special interest group. Assume without loss of
generality that the special interest group prefers right-wing ideology, i.e. b z > 0, and for any z 2 (0;b z) the
utility W(z;q) is increasing in q. In other words, the special interest group prefers the largest possible
audience to be exposed to the news with a ￿positive" bias.
This section shows that the relationship between the economic parameters (e.g. a, d) and the extent
of distortion introduced by the presence of the special interest group depends on the assumptions. The





@q2 = 0 (6)
This assumption means that for the special interest group, the optimal z is a non-increasing function




additional person in the audience is constant, i.e. W is linear in q.
17Consider the following problem for the special interest group: max
z





￿ 0 means that the optimal news coverage argmax
z
W(z;q) is non-increasing in q. It is the case when the special
interest group￿ s ideal point does not depend on q, or when the special interest group wants more extreme media coverage if
the audience size q (taken as a parameter!) is smaller. The latter assumption implies that bias and audience are substitutes:
if the audience size is small, then the extent of bias should be large, while if the audience size is large, then the bias should
be moderate.
11We also consider the case of a budget constraint of the interest group (i.e. SIG￿ s constraint has the
form C(z;q) ￿ B, where B is the budget of the interest group)
The proposition below shows the comparative statics of equilibrium news coverage with respect to
characteristics of media production, of consumer demand, and of the preferences of special interest groups.
Proposition 1 If there is one interest group and one media outlet and the most preferred news coverage
for the special interest group is b z > 0
1. Equilibrium media bias e z satis￿es 0 < e z < b z;
2. If assumption (6) is satis￿ed, then:















￿ ￿ is higher for any z);









￿ ￿ is higher for any 0 < z < b z);
3. If the special interest group is budget constrained then








￿ Bias e z does not depend on the marginal valuation of media bias by the special interest group;
Proof. In Appendix A.
The intuition behind this set of results is as follows. A media outlet considers choosing a bias z, and
weighs the costs of bias in terms of forgone advertising and sales revenues against the bene￿ts of bias in
12the form of a subsidy from the special interest group. If marginal costs of media production d decrease,
or the pro￿tability of advertising a increases, or elasticity of consumer demand with respect to media
bias increase, this implies that the marginal costs
￿ ￿













, increases by a lesser amount. As a result, the optimal bias of the media
outlet goes down. Similarly, if the marginal valuation of media bias by the special interest group go up,
marginal costs of bias remain the same, and bene￿ts go up. As a result, the optimal bias of the media
outlet goes up.
The ￿ndings of Hamilton (2004), Gentzkow et al. (2006), and Petrova (2010) are consistent with these
theoretical predictions. In all of these studies, the authors argue that the decrease in the marginal costs
of printing newspapers or the increase in the pro￿tability of advertising at the end of the 19th century
led to more objective media coverage and made the U.S. press more independent from the in￿ uence of
political parties, which could be viewed as special interest groups in the context of this model.
A more scrupulous analysis of Proposition 1 show that it does not cover all potential cases. If people
do not pay too much attention to media bias when making their purchasing decision, and the special
interest group is very interested in the size of the audience, the comparative statics is di⁄erent There is






@q2 ￿ 0 (7)
Note that this assumption may seem more intuitive than (6), as it implies that the bias and the audi-
ence are complements, and the marginal utility of an additional person is non-decreasing. In particular,
such a simple function as W = zq18 satis￿es conditions (7).
Also, assume that consumers do not pay too much attention to bias, as compared with the interest
group. In particular, we assume that the relative marginal change in audience due to bias as compared
18Ellman and Germano (2009) obtain this functional form with a microfounded model of an advertiser￿ s preferences.
13with a corresponding change due to increase in a price is smaller than the corresponding change in the




















Then, the following proposition could be shown:
Proposition 2 If there is one interest group and one media outlet and the most preferred news coverage
for the special interest group is b z > 0, then
1. Equilibrium media bias e z satis￿es 0 < e z < b z;
2. If (7) and (8) are satis￿ed then:








Proof. In Appendix A.
The comparison of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 allows us to make predictions about environments
in which we should expect the positive e⁄ect of economic development on the amount of media outlet￿ s
news distortion. If people in the economy do not care too much about bias and are sensitive to price, then
media should move further from the ideal point of consumers as marginal costs decrease and advertising
revenue per reader go up. We expect a similar e⁄ect if the special interest group in the economy has a
higher marginal valuation of bias and does not have budget constraint, e.g. if it is the government of a
country with a low level of political competition. If, in contrast, the special interest group has a budget
constraint or the elasticity of consumer demand with respect to bias is high, media should move closer to










14the ideal point of consumers as marginal costs decrease and advertising revenue per reader go up. The
section below shows that the latter e⁄ect is even more likely to take place if we consider several special
interest groups with diverse preferences instead of one.
3.2 One media outlet and several special interest groups
In this section, we analyze what happens if more than one special interest group can subsidize a single
media outlet. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the case of two special interest groups.20 These groups
can have either aligned or misaligned preferences. In the model, the preferences of special interest groups
are aligned if they have the same desired direction of bias. We consider the case of two interest groups
whose ideal points b z1 and b z2 are both positive (aligned preferences), and the case where b z1 and b z2 are
positive and negative (misaligned preferences). The equilibrium news coverage for the case in which only
group i is allowed to o⁄er a contribution to the media outlet is denoted as e zi. If two special interest
groups can o⁄er contributions to a media outlet, then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 If the preferences of di⁄erent special interest groups are aligned (b zi > 0, i = 1;2), then
the type of news coverage e z of a media outlet lies strictly between e z1 and e z2, so that the media bias is
higher than minfe z1;e z2g. If the preferences of di⁄erent special interest groups are misaligned (b z1 > 0,
b z2 < 0), then the equilibrium news ideology lies strictly between e z1 and e z2, and the resulting bias is less
than maxfje z1j;je z2jg.
Proof. In Appendix A.
If the preferences of di⁄erent special interest groups are aligned, then the resulting coverage is, on
average, further from the ideal point of consumers than the coverage in the case in which the preferences
of di⁄erent special interest groups are misaligned.21 This proposition formalizes the argument made by
20The proposition below can be easily extended to the case of N special interest groups. The same stylized results hold.
21Here ￿on average" is interpreted as ￿in expectation", if ideal points of special interest groups are, for example, uniformly
distributed on the same interval.
15Herman and Chomsky (1988) in that there is a signi￿cant aggregate bias in the news about those issues
for which preferences of various interests in the economy are similar (e.g. foreign policy), and there is
a smaller aggregate bias, if any, in the news about issues for which these preferences di⁄er signi￿cantly
(e.g. the support of a candidate from a particular party in presidential elections).
This proposition shows that the structure of the market in which media sell their content to the special
interesting groups matters. If there are more than one special interest group with opposing preferences,
media should be less biased as compared with the case of one special interest group. This e⁄ect may
be reinforced by the information processing features of the demand side. As empirically shown in Zaller
(1992), a single media message is much more likely to a⁄ect public opinion than multiple potentially
con￿ icting messages.
3.3 Two media outlets
The model above describes the basic intuition for the trade-o⁄ faced by a single media outlet which
sells its product to both media consumers and special interest groups. We now present the model





Wi(zj;qj(p(z);z)) ￿ cij where j denotes a media outlet.
We analyze the case of general demand function qj(z;p), so that some of the micro-founded models
of consumer demand are special cases.22 We separately consider the cases of fully covered market (i.e.
all consumers consume one unit of media product) and not fully covered market (i.e. aggregate demand
for a media product may change). We also look at the case of a budget constrained interest groups.
The timing is the following: (1) special interest groups, simultaneously and independently, o⁄er
22E.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al. (2001), Gabszewicz et al. (2002), Ellman and Germano (2009)
use di⁄erent IO models to model the interaction between media outlets, their audience, and advertisers. Depending on the
chosen model, there are di⁄erent demand functions faced by media outlets. We do not present a microfounded model to
keep the results as general as possible.
16subsidies to media outlets, (2) media outlets choose their news coverage, and (3) media outlets choose





We start from the case of fully covered markets, i.e. the case in which all consumers buy exactly one
copy of a newspaper or watch one broadcast channel etc. The results in this section are similar to Anderson
and Gabszewicz (2006), Anderson and Coate (2005), and Armstrong (2006). Assume that the demand has
the following form: q1(z;p) = A(z1;z2)+(p2￿p1)B(z1;z2), q2(z;p) = D(z1;z2)+(p1￿p2)B(z1;z2) where
A(z1;z2), B(z1;z2), and D(z1;z2) are some di⁄erentiable functions. Here q1(z;p) and q2(z;p) depend only
on the price di⁄erence because we assumed that neither consumer abstains from consumption of a media
product (otherwise, A(z1;z2) or D(z1;z2) could also be functions of pj). At the ￿rst stage, media outlets
choose z1 and z2; at the last stage, each media outlet chooses the price from their respective problems.
The ￿rst order conditions imply that optimal qs depend only on the price di⁄erence that is a function of
zs chosen at the ￿rst stage. 23 As a result, neither qj(z) = qj(z;p(z)) nor ￿j(z;p) = (pj(z)+a￿d)qj(z;p)
depend on d or a. This is a revenue neutrality result.24 It happens because media outlets fully transfer
the costs of production of a media product to media consumers.
With revenue neutrality, the equilibrium choice of z does not depend on d or a, as these parameters
do not a⁄ect neither the size of the audience of a media outlet nor its forgone pro￿t when it chooses the
news coverage desired by a special interest group. So, theoretically, if there is competition between media
outlets, and the markets are fully covered, and there should not be an e⁄ect of falling marginal costs or
23At the last stage, media outlets solve (p1 + a ￿ d)[A(z1;z2) + (p2 ￿ p1)B(z1;z2)] ! max
p1
, (p2 + a ￿
d)[D(z1;z2) + (p1 ￿ p2)B(z1;z2)] ! max
p2



























24Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) show this result under more general assumptions for N media outlets.
17increasing pro￿tability of advertising.
Not fully covered markets
In this section, we look at the case in which the aggregate demand for media outlets depends on
the price, i.e. if prices of both media outlets go up, it may prevent media consumers from paying
for either media product. From the basic setup, we keep the assumption that W(z;q(p(z);z)) is a
concave function of each z with SIG￿ s ideal z > 0. As before, we consider a general case of a demand
function given by qj(z;p). To proceed, we need to make some reasonable assumptions about the function
qj(z;p) and its derivatives. Assume that
@qj(z;p)
@pj




(higher competitor￿ s price increase consumption), and
@[qj(z;p) + q￿j(z;p)]
@pj
< 0 (markets are not fully



















￿ ￿ (own price is not less






= 0 (separability). We consider
a symmetric equilibrium in which
@qi(z;p)
@zi
￿ 0 for zi = z￿i ￿ 0,
@qi(z;p)
@z￿i
￿ 0 for zi = z￿i ￿ 0 (there
is lower demand for a product located further from 0), and
@[qi(z;p) + q￿i(z;p)]
@zi
= 0 (the aggregate
demand remains the same if one of two media outlets with the same coverage changes its position a little
bit).










pi ￿ maxfu0;y ￿ ￿(
￿ ￿zj ￿ z￿i
￿




￿) ￿ p￿i ￿ maxfu0;y ￿
￿(
￿ ￿zj ￿ zi
￿ ￿)￿pig, and no media product at all if u0 ￿ maxfy ￿￿(
￿ ￿zj ￿ zi
￿ ￿)￿pi;y ￿￿(
￿ ￿zj ￿ z￿i
￿
￿)￿p￿ig.
Under this set of assumptions, the propositions analogous to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 could be
proven. The presence of one interest group distorts equilibrium choices made by media outlets and makes
media outlets biased in the direction desired by the special interest group. The presence of two interest
groups with opposing preferences stretches equilibrium positions of media outlets in two directions so
18that media outlets become more polarized. In both cases, marginal costs ensure that media equilibrium
is either less or more distorted by the presence of special interest groups, depending on the preferences
of interest groups and consumers￿tolerance for bias.
Formally, denote e z the vector of equilibrium choices of news coverage in the presence of interest
groups.
Proposition 4 If there are two media outlets and there is one or two special interest groups,
1. If assumptions (6) are satis￿ed, then:








2. If assumptions (7) and (8) are satis￿ed, then:








Proof. In Appendix B.
Note that the "paradox result" of Ellman and Germano (2009) is consistent with the second part
of this Proposition. In Ellman and Germano (2009), W = zq (in our notation), which satis￿es (7).
If a media outlet relies more on the pro￿t from a special interest group (advertiser in their case), it
corresponds to higher d or smaller a (explicit cost of advertising, in contrast to subsidies paid in addition
to this explicit cost).
Budget constrained special interest groups
If every special interest group faces a binding budget constraint, then the relationship between the
extent of distortion in news coverage, marginal costs of production, and advertising revenues per reader
becomes unambiguous. We can prove the following proposition:
19Proposition 5 If there are two media outlets and there is one or two special interest groups, and special
interest groups face binding budget constraints, then








Proof. In Appendix B.
The intuition behind this Proposition is straightforward. A decrease in the marginal costs of pro-
duction or an increase in unit advertising revenues makes subsidizing media more costly, as it increases
the forgone pro￿t which a special interest group has to reimburse in order to distort media behavior. If
a budget constraint is binding, the interest group can a⁄ord subsidizing a smaller bias as the marginal
costs go up.
3.4 Several special interest groups
In this section, we consider what happens if the number of budget constrained special interest groups
goes up, while their aggregate budget constraint is remained unchanged. In particular, assume that all




, and all the interest groups have aligned preferences.
Under this set of assumptions, we can prove the following result:
Proposition 6 If the total amount of money, which can be spent on subsidizing media, C is ￿xed,




goes up, the resulting media equilibrium is less distorted in favor of interest
groups: for any i
￿
￿ ￿e zi ￿ e z0
i
￿
￿ ￿ is a decreasing function of N.
Proof. In Appendix B.
20This result follows from the fact that higher number of special interest groups tightens budget con-
straint of each particular group, and, therefore, it becomes more di¢ cult for them compensate a media
outlet for a marginal change in news coverage.25
This proposition can be interpreted in the following way. If advertising markets are more concentrated
(i.e. the number of advertisers in this market is smaller, while the total amount of money in the market
stays the same) then the media bias is expected to be larger. Therefore, empirically higher concentration
of special interest groups in the economy leads to more distorted news coverage, controlling for the size
of advertising market. This result arises because media outlets compete for such a scarce resource as
advertising revenues. Similar prediction is discussed, although not modeled, by Dyck et al. (2008).
The importance of a number of advertisers was known to media outlets long ago. Adolph S. Ochs,
one of early publishers of the New York Times, in 1916 said: ￿It may seem like a contradiction (yet
it is true) to assert: the greater the number of advertisers, the less in￿ uence they are individually able
to exercise with the publisher."26 Starr (2004) also notices that advertising revenues in the print media
typically came from di⁄erent sources, in contrast to far more concentrated of radio programs, and this
was the reason why radio programs become much more dependent on advertisers and, as a result, exhibit
higher bias in favor of advertisers.
A corollary from Proposition 6 is the following: even if there is an in￿nite number of media outlets
in the market, this does not necessarily lead to the absence of a media bias.27 However, if there is an
in￿nite number of special interest groups in the economy, with ideal points distributed along (￿1;+1),
then it is enough to guarantee the absence of aggregate bias, according to Proposition 3 extended for the
case of many special interest groups and many media outlets).
25A driving condition for this result is the convexity of indi⁄erence curve of the media outlet j in the plane (z;c).
26From an address by Mr. Adolph S. Ochs, publisher of The New York Times, at the Philadelphia Convention of the
Associated Advertising Clubs of The Associated Advertising Club of the World. 07.26.1916. Cited in Elmer Davis, "History
of the New York Times, 1851-1921", pp. 397-398
27This result parallels ￿ndings of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005).
214 Implications
The model described above suggests that we can predict the relationship between economic growth,
technological change, and the distortions in news coverage. Depending on the circumstances, we can
observe di⁄erent e⁄ects. We expect falling marginal costs and growing advertising revenues to have a
positive e⁄ect if people do not tolerate bias, if special interest groups do not pay too much attention to
the size of the audience, if those groups face binding budget constraint, and if there are multiple SIGs and
media outlets in the economy. For example, in the 19th century United States, political parties played
the role of special interest groups in the framework of our model. Because people disliked bias, interest
groups had opposing preferences and faced budget constraints, and thus the model predicts a positive
e⁄ect of economic variables on newspaper independence. The empirical results in Gentzkow et al. (2006)
and Petrova (2010) are consistent with these predictions. We would expect similar e⁄ects in countries
with similar economic and institutional environment, such as Mexico in the 1990s.
Second, we would expect a negative e⁄ect of falling marginal costs, or the growth of advertising
pro￿tability, if people do not care too much about bias, if SIGs have aligned preferences, or if there is a
single SIG or no competition between media outlets. Thus, we doubt that the media in African countries
would become less biased as a result of economic development.
Third, we expect no e⁄ect of the economic environment on media independence if markets are fully
covered. For example, if the majority of the population receives information from free broadcast channels
(e.g. in Russia or other CIS countries), neither falling marginal costs nor the growth of advertising can
substantially change the aggregate media audience. Correspondingly, our model predicts no e⁄ect of
marginal costs or advertising pro￿tability per se, even though the incentives of interest groups may
change.28
28For example, rising prices for natural resources may increase the rents available for dictatorial governments and, at the
same time, the pro￿tability of advertising. As a result, these governments, acting as special interest groups, are ready to
pay more to stay in power and to silence independent media (as discussed in Egorov et al. (ming)). So, empirically, an
22Proposition 1 implies that media consumers can be fooled by biased media only if they are ready to
accept this bias. If people stop consuming the media product when its bias becomes too high, or if they
can easily switch to a less biased media product, then in￿ uencing public opinion becomes much more
di¢ cult. Therefore, as in the de Maitre quote that says ￿every country has the government it deserves,"
we can say ￿every country has the media it deserves." This proposition highlights the importance of the
audience for the news coverage.
Our model also allows us to di⁄erentiate the e⁄ect of economic development on the political versus
commercial media bias. Assume that conditions (6) are satis￿ed. Then if the media rely more on
advertising revenues, there should be fewer political distortions in news coverage and more distortions in
the coverage of advertisers.
In the framework in our model, the e⁄ect of competition is ambiguous. If special interest groups are
budget constrained, as in Proposition 6, then the competition between media outlets is indeed bene￿cial.
If budget constraints are not an important issue, then competition does not help, and the results in
Proposition 4 are not very di⁄erent from the results in Propositions 1 and 2.
5 Conclusions
Many scholars (e.g. Downs (1957), Olson (1965), Olson (1982), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Grossman
and Helpman (2001)) note that special interest groups have a comparative advantage in information
awareness: they possess much better knowledge about related issues and policies than either policymakers
or society as a whole. Grossman and Helpman (1999) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) point out that
under certain circumstances interest groups will reveal a portion of their information to the general public,
and therefore are engaged in the process of ￿educating voters." Or, they will use endorsements to help
their members learn their own preferences. Media outlets are important because their product is not only
increase in marginal revenues from advertising may be associated with a decrease in media independence (Gehlbach and
Sonin (2008)).
23commercial, but also a public good that provides people with the information necessary to sustain the
political system of representative democracy (Lazarsfeld et al. (1948)). A number of authors (Gentzkow
et al. (2006), Dyck et al. (2008), Dyck and Zingales (2002)) argue that free and independent mass media
can constrain the behavior of special interest groups and restrict their in￿ uence on policy outcomes by
revealing information those special interest groups want to conceal. In contrast, in this paper we analyze
the case of media bias that is induced by special interest groups, which is more in line with Sobbrio
(2010), Besley and Prat (2006), and Gabszewicz et al. (2001).
Our model describes the interaction between special interest groups and media outlets under an
audience constraint. Media outlets face a trade-o⁄between a larger audience and less biased content (and
thus lower contributions) and a smaller audience and more biased content. As a result, a number of factors
become important for news coverage: the technology (such as the marginal costs of media production;
potential sales and advertising revenues at the status quo point), the properties of the consumer demand
function (elasticity of demand for the media product with respect to the extent of media bias); and
the characteristics of special interest groups trying to a⁄ect news coverage (their number, the alignment
of their preferences, and their marginal valuation of particular news coverage). Therefore, our model
combines supply-side and demand-side explanations of media bias.
We identify three di⁄erent e⁄ects of economic development on media coverage. Petrova (2010) shows
that in the United States in the 19th century, growing advertising revenues stimulated the development of
an independent press, consistent with Propositions 1 and 4 of the model. Empirically testing the model￿ s
propositions in other countries and times is a potentially fruitful avenue of future research.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1. Subgame perfect equilibrium in this game is found by backward induction.
In the last stage, a media outlet chooses coverage z and accepts a contribution c from a special interest
group if for this z max
p ￿(p;z) + c(z) ￿ ￿￿, where ￿￿ is the pro￿t which can be earned without the




(p+a￿d)q(p;z), p(z) = argmax
p
￿(p;z), and
q(z) = q(p(z);z). The problem of the special interest group can be rewritten as
max
z;c W(z;q(p(z);z)) ￿ c (9)
s:t: ￿(z) + c ￿ ￿￿
Note that a pro￿t maximizing special interest group will never pay the media outlet more than
necessary to get the desired bias, which implies that the inequality in (9) is satis￿ed with an equality.
Therefore, the problem (9) can be rewritten as
max
z
W(z;q(z)) ￿ ￿￿ + ￿(z) (10)












First, we want to show that the optimal news coverage satis￿es 0 < z < b z. From (11), it follows that
the optimal e z which solves (10) lies within the range [0;b z] Suppose that it is not the case, and e z < 0 or
e z > b z. Then the utility of the special interest group would be higher it would choose policy 0 instead
of e z < 0, or policy b z instead of e z > b z. So, the choice of z such that e z < 0 or e z > b z is not consistent




= 0; by de￿nition, and
dW
dz
(0;q) is positive. Also, F(b z) < 0, because
dW
dz
jz=b z = 0,
29and b z solves (5). Note also that
@￿(z)
@z
< 0, as b z is not optimal for the media outlet (optimal point for
an outlet is normalized to 0). As a result, we show that equilibrium media policy e z satis￿es 0 < e z < b z.
Now, assume that (6) is satis￿ed. Then, in order to show that e z is an increasing function of d, we can









: The mixed derivative of the objective


























= ￿g0(p(z)) < 0 and
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dz










































(p + a ￿ d)g00(p) + 2g0(p)













The mixed derivative of the objective function in (10) with respect to z and d is greater or equal to 0 if
@G(z;q)
@q











, which is less
than 0 by assumption (6) (note that
@2W(z;q(p(z);z))
@q2 = 0). As a result,
@F
@d
￿ 0, function W(z;q(z))￿
￿￿ + ￿(z) is supermodular, and e z is an increasing function of d. Similarly, the mixed derivative of the
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30which is less or equal to 0 if
@G(z;q)
@q
￿ 0 and z > 0. As a result,
@F
@a









< 0, and e z is a decreasing function of a.
Now, consider the transformation of demand function so that the elasticity of demand with respect




















￿ goes up for any z.





















= (p + a ￿ d)
dh
dz
also goes down. To restore the equi-












@z2 > 0) For z such that 0 < z < b z,
dW
dz
jz is positive, so the overall e⁄ect of a mar-
ginal decrease in z on the perturbed left-hand side of equation (11) is positive. As a result, equilibrium,
described by (11), could be restored only by decreasing z.
Now consider the e⁄ect of a change in
@W(z;q(p;z))
@z
, a marginal valuation of bias by the special
interest group, such that
@W(z;q(p;z))
@z
goes up for any z. After this change, the ￿rst term in the left-
hand side of (11) goes up, and all other terms remain constant. So, in order to restore the equilibrium
and satisfy (11), we need to increase z, so that
dW
dz
jz goes down, and
d￿(z)
dz







goes up for every z, it implies that the optimal bias z goes up too.
Now consider the case of a budget constraint, i.e. that the special interest group can spend on
subsidizing media not more than C. If the budget constraint is binding, it implies that the problem of
the special interest group can be rewritten as
max
z;c W(z;q(p(z);z)) ￿ C (12)
s:t: ￿(z) = ￿￿ ￿ C = (p￿ + a ￿ d)q￿ ￿ C
In other words, z is found as the solution of the equation ￿(z) = max
p
(p + a ￿ d)[h(z) ￿ g(p)] = (p￿ +
a ￿ d)q￿ ￿ C, or C = (p￿ + a ￿ d)q￿ ￿ (p(z) + a ￿ d)q(z). The derivative of the right-hand side of this
31equation with respect to z is
@
@z
((p￿ +a￿d)q￿ ￿(p(z)+a￿d)q(z)) = ￿
d￿(z)
dz
= ￿(p+a￿d)h0(z) > 0.
The corresponding derivative with respect to d is ￿q￿ +q(z) < 0; as q￿ maximizes q(z) by de￿nition. So,
by the implicit function theorem, optimal z which solves C = (p￿ + a ￿ d)q￿ ￿ (p(z) + a ￿ d)q(z) is an
increasing function of d. Similarly, the derivative of (p￿ +a￿d)q￿ ￿(p(z)+a￿d)q(z) with respect to a
is q￿ ￿q(z) > 0; as q￿ maximizes q(z) by de￿nition. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, optimal
z which solves C = (p￿ + a ￿ d)q￿ ￿ (p(z) + a ￿ d)q(z) is an increasing function of a.
Proof of Proposition 2. The ￿rst part of the proof of Proposition 2 repeats the corresponding part
of the proof of Proposition 1.
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< 0, and e z is a decreasing function of d.



















































































< 0, and e z is a decreasing function of d.


































































































> 0, and e z is an increasing function of a.
Proof of proposition 3. In this case a problem of special interest group i can be written as
max
z
Wi(z;q(p12(z);z)) ￿ Ci; i 2 f1;2g (13)
s:t: ￿(p12(z);z;Ci(z));C￿i(z))) ￿ ￿(p￿i(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i(e z￿i))
where C￿i(z) is a contribution schedule of the other special interest group, z is news coverage of a
single media outlet, e zi is the media coverage chosen by the media outlet with special interest group
33i, p12(z) solves max
p
￿(p;z), )p￿i(e z￿i) solves max
p
￿(p;e z￿i). At the optimal point, the special inter-
est group does not pay more than necessary to the media outlet, so the constraint in the problem
(13) is binding, and ￿(p12(z);z;Ci(z));C￿i(z)) = ￿(p￿i(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i(e z￿i)). As a result, Ci(z) =
￿(p￿i(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i(e z￿i)) ￿ (p12(z) + a ￿ d)q12(p12(z);z) ￿ C￿i(z): Therefore, the problem (13) of the
special interest group i can be rewritten as
max
z
Wi(z;q(z)) ￿ ￿(p￿i(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i(e z￿i)) + (p12(z) + a ￿ d)q12(p12(z);z) + C￿i(z)
As ￿￿(p￿i(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i(e z￿i)) does not depend on z, this problem is equivalent to
max
z
Wi(z;q12(z)) + (p12(z) + a ￿ d)q12(p12(z);z) + C￿i(z) (14)
Let￿ s denote q12(z) = q12(p12(z);z). First order condition for the problem (14) (using the envelope















In the equilibrium, e z12 which solves (15) is the same for both i 2 f1;2g. Also this e z12 solves the
problem of the media outlet
max




First order condition for this problem is










Combined (15) for both i and (16) yield that equilibrium e z12 is also a solution of the following
equation:30
30In fact, it is a Grossman-Helpman e¢ ciency result (Grossman and Helpman 2001).















Wi(z;q12(z)) + (p12(z) + a ￿ d)q12(z)
Suppose both b zi > 0, i = 1;2. Assume, without loss of generality, that b z1 < b z2. Then the left-hand side












0 as b z1 < b z2. Similarly, the left-hand side of (17) at the point b z2 is less than 0. As a result, continuity of
all functions implies that a solution of (17) lies between b z1 and b z2. Similar argument holds for the case
b z1 > 0, b z2 < 0.
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Wi(zj;qj(p(z);z)) ￿ cij; i 2 f1;2g
s:t: ￿j(p(z);z;Cij(z));C￿ij(z))) ￿ ￿(p￿i(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i;j(e z￿i)); j 2 f1;2g
We consider separately the case of one interest group and the case of two interest groups.
One special interest group, two media outlets





W(zj;qj(p(z);z)) + C1(z) + C2(z)
s:t: ￿1(p(z);z;C1(z)) ￿ ￿1(z)
￿2(p(z);z;C2(z)) ￿ ￿2(z)
where ￿i(z) is the pro￿t of media outlet i without subsidies from the special interest group if news
coverage of both outlets is given by (z1;z2). As the special interest group does not want to pay a media





W(zj;qj(p(z);z)) + ￿1(z) + ￿2(z) (18)
First, we want to derive the comparative statics for the solution of (18) with respect to key parameters.
In particular, we are going to use the results of robust comparative statics (Athey et al. (1998)). Denote
the objective function in (18) as F.
Note that p(z) is computed from the problem of an individual media outlet at the ￿rst stage, i.e. as a
solution of max
pj




36Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the comparative statics of p with respect to zj, z￿j,










































= 1=2 ￿ 0:
















































































































































































































. Under assumptions (6) or (7) and (8), all terms in
the last expression are non-negative, and F has increasing di⁄erences in (z1;z2).

























































































￿ 0). The supermodularity of F implies that each e zj is increasing (decreasing)
function of d if (6) is satis￿ed ((7) and (8) are satis￿ed). Similarly, each e zj is decreasing (increasing)
function of a if (6) is satis￿ed ((7) and (8) are satis￿ed). .





Wi(zj;qj(pj(z);z)) ￿ cij; i 2 f1;2g (19)
s:t: ￿j(pj(z);z;Cij(z));C￿i;j(z))) ￿ ￿(p￿i;j(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i;j(e z￿i)); j 2 f1;2g
Note ￿rst that at the optimal point, a special interest group does not pay more than necessary to
the media outlet, so the constraint in the problem (19) is binding, and ￿j(pj(z);z;Cij(z));C￿i;j(z))) =
￿j(p￿i;j(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i;j(e z￿i)). As a result, Cij(z) = ￿j(p￿i;j(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i;j(e z￿i)) ￿ (pj(z) + a ￿






Wi(zj;qj(pj(z);z)) ￿ ￿j(p￿i;j(e z￿i);e z￿i;0;C￿i;j(e z￿i)) + (pj(z) + a ￿ d)qj(pj(z);z) + C￿i;j(z)
￿






Wi(zj;qj(pj(z);z)) + (pj(z) + a ￿ d)qj(pj(z);z) + C￿i;j(z)
￿















@zj = 0; j 2 f1;2g
The system of equations (20) for i = 1;2 gives the solution for the problem (19) if Hessian matrix for
each pair of conditions is positively semi-de￿nite.
38Also, e z, the solution of (20), solves the pro￿t maximization problem of each media outlet:
max
zj




First order condition for this problem is





















Wi(zj;qj(pj(z);z)) + (pj(z) + a ￿ d)qj(pj(z);z)
￿
This result is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1994) e¢ ciency result, extended for the case of
several interest groups.


























@zj q￿j(p(z);z) = 0; j 2 f1;2g
Now, we can ￿nd the derivatives of e z with respect to parameters using an implicit function theorem.
For the case of aligned interests (preferred points of both interest groups are to positive), the proof is
the same as for the case of a single special interest group. For the case of misaligned interests, note
that subsidies to media outlets from the other side of coverage are not permitted, so the problem of each
interest group could be simpli￿ed to max
z
Wi(zi;qi(p(z);z)) + (pj(z) + a ￿ d)qj(p(z);z) + C￿i;i(z), which
is reduced to the problem in the previous subsection.
39Proof of proposition 6. The problem of special interest group i is
M X
j=1





￿(zj;z￿j;C￿i(￿)) ￿ ￿(zj;z￿j) = ￿(z￿






Note that it is not pro￿table for a special interest group to pay media outlet more than it is necessary to
get desired coverage zj. So, this problem is equivalent to
M X
j=1











































The solution of this problem is the best response of special interest group i to strategies chosen by
the others C￿i(￿), here i = 1;:::;N. Note that for a given set of functions ￿(z￿
j;z￿j;C￿i(￿)), when best
response functions are taken as given and the presence of a new special interest group does not change
optimal solution, the following statement is true. If N goes up, all equilibrium z go down if special
interest group i prefers positive bias (and go up if special interest group i prefers negative bias). Now,
what happens if ￿(z￿
j;z￿j;C￿i(￿)) is not ￿xed? If N increases by 1, this implies that new interest group
40might be willing to o⁄er contribution to some media outlets. As the preferred point of this special interest
group is more extreme than the preferred
To derive comparative statics with respect to N, note that mixed derivative of Lagrangian with
respect to z and N is equal to 0.
41